

# Model-based Engineering of Supervisory Controllers

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IPA Formal Methods Course

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# Subjects


- ▶ Model-based engineering (MBE) of supervisory controllers
- ▶ Design models
- ▶ Modelling and validation (simulation and visualization/animation)
- ▶ Discrete-event models
- ▶ Supervisor synthesis
  - ▶ MBSE for supervisory control synthesis
  - ▶ Specification of requirements
  - ▶ Basic data-based supervisory control problem
  - ▶ CIF support for synthesis

# Systems Engineering

- ▶ Interdisciplinary process
- ▶ To ensure stakeholder needs are satisfied
- ▶ In a high quality, trustworthy, cost efficient and schedule compliant manner
- ▶ Throughout entire system life cycle

1. State the problem. Requirements should be traceable to this problem statement. What must be done, not how to do it.
2. Investigate alternatives. Performance, schedule, cost and risk figures, compliance with requirements.
3. Model the system. Models help explain the system, can be used in tradeoff studies and risk management.
4. Integrate. Components, modules, systems, etc. must be integrated so that they interact with one another.
5. Launch the system. Preferred alternative is designed in detail; the parts are built, integrated and tested at various levels.
6. Assess performance. Technical performance measures and metrics are used.
7. Re-evaluate, re-evaluate, re-evaluate.


# Traditional engineering model: V-model




# Supervisory control

Coordination of behavior of a (cyber-physical) system from discrete-event observations of its state.


Based on them the supervisory controller decides on the activities that the uncontrolled system can safely perform and that lead to acceptable system behavior.



# MBSE for supervisory control



# Modelling plants and supervisors



- ▶ uncontrolled system / plant
- ▶ supervisor / controller
- ▶ controlled plant
- ▶ requirements

# Concepts in cyber-physical systems

1. *Physical quantities*, such as temperature, speed, mass, energy, etc.
2. Different *operational modes*, such as equipment being on/off, maintenance modes, error modes, modes associated with different functions of the systems under consideration.
3. *Decomposition* of the system in subsystems, e.g., a robot may consist of subsystems for movement, vision, etc.
4. *Interaction* between the subsystems, e.g., exchange of material and information.

# Physical quantities

Time-evolution of such quantities: differential equations!

Acceleration of a vehicle:  $\dot{v} = 15$

Mass attached to spring:

$$m \cdot \ddot{x} + k \cdot x = 0$$

where

- ▶  $x$  is the extension of the spring
- ▶  $m$  is the mass
- ▶  $k$  is the spring constant that represents a measure of spring stiffness

# Mode switching


Different operational modes of a vehicle:

- ▶ Standing still:  $\dot{v} = 0$
- ▶ Accelerating:  $\dot{v} = a$
- ▶ Driving:  $\dot{v} = 0$
- ▶ Decelerating:  $\dot{v} = -a$


Switching between modes based on values of continuous quantities such as speed.

Exercise: give some examples of systems where you observe phenomena that could be classified as mode switching!

# Mode switching in hybrid automata




## Another example: Thermostat



We will use simulation to convince ourselves (and others) that the model is in correspondence with reality. This called validation.


# CIF modelling language

- ▶ Automata-based modelling language that supports MBE of supervisory controllers.



- ▶ Developed by Control Systems Technology Group.
- ▶ CIF open source ([cif.se.wtb.tue.nl](http://cif.se.wtb.tue.nl)): code can be freely downloaded, used and adapted.

# CIF model for thermostat



```
1 automaton thermostat:
2   const real a = 0.1;
3   cont x = 20;
4
5   location Off:
6     initial;
7     equation x' = - a * x;
8     edge when x <= 19 goto On;
9
10  location On:
11    equation x' = - a * (x - 30);
12    edge when x >= 21 goto Off;
13 end
```

# CIF screenshot

The screenshot displays the Eclipse IDE interface for a CIF simulation. The main window is titled "Resource - CIF3Examples-r7302/tank/tank.cif - Eclipse".

**Project Explorer:** Shows a project structure with folders like "bouncing\_ball", "buffer\_3place", "button\_lamp", "conveyor", "fluid", "machine\_buffer", "mutex", and "tank". The "tank" folder is expanded, showing "tank.cif" as the selected file.

**Code Editor (tank.cif):** Contains the following CIF code:

```
group tank:
  cont V = 10.0;
  alg real Qi = controller.n * 5.0;
  alg real Qo = sqrt(V);
  equation V' = Qi - Qo;

  svgout id "water" attr "height" value 7.5 * V;
  svgout id "V" text value fmt("V = %.2f", V);
  svgout id "Qi" text value fmt("Qi = %.1f", Qi);
  svgout id "Qo" text value fmt("Qo = %.2f", Qo);
end

automaton controller:
  alg int n;

  location closed:
    initial;
    equation n = 0;
    edge when tank.V <= 2 goto opened;

  location opened:
```

**Plot Visualizer:** A line graph showing the simulation results over time (0 to 32.5). The y-axis ranges from -5.0 to 15. The plot shows several variables: controller.n (yellow), tank.Qi (green), tank.Qo (blue), tank.V (cyan), and tank.V' (purple). The variables exhibit oscillatory behavior.

**SVG Visualizer:** A schematic diagram of the tank system. It shows a valve labeled "n" with a green valve symbol. The flow rate is labeled "Qi = 5.0". The tank is represented by a blue rectangle with a volume "V = 9.44". The outflow rate is labeled "Qo = 3.07". A variable "VC" is shown in a circle connected to the tank.

**State Visualizer:** A table showing the current state of the simulation:

Name	Value
time	32.124999999999998
controller	opened
controller.n	1
tank.Qi	5.0
tank.Qo	3.072459172983838

**Problems Console:** Shows the following messages:

```
ToolDef 1.2 interpreter [TERMINATED after 1m 14s 507ms] /CIF3Examples-r7302/tank/tank.tooldef (started at 2014-06-05 14:15:58.467)
Transition: delaying for 3.1883905325514345 time units at time 30.23416310817113
Simulation was terminated per the user's request.
```

# CIF documentation



The screenshot shows the homepage of the CIF 3 website. The browser address bar shows the URL [cif.sew.tue.nl/index.html](http://cif.sew.tue.nl/index.html). The page title is "CIF 3" and the navigation menu includes "Home", "About", "Download", "Documentation", "Support", and "Search". The main content area features a welcome message, a description of CIF 3 as an automata-based modeling language, and information about its development by the Systems Engineering group at TU/e. Below this, there are two sections: "Information" with icons for About, Download, Support, Index, and Search; and "Documentation" with icons for Language tutorial, CIF 3 textual syntax (PDF), Event-based supervisory controller, Tools, and Changelog for version r7363.

**CIF 3**

Welcome to the website for CIF 3, the **Compositional Interchange Format** for hybrid systems. CIF is an automata-based modeling language for the specification of discrete event, timed, and hybrid systems. The CIF 3 tooling supports the entire development process of controllers, including specification, supervisory controller synthesis, simulation-based validation and visualization, verification, real-time testing, code generation, etc.

CIF 3 was created and is currently developed by the **Systems Engineering** group of the **Mechanical Engineering** department, at the **Eindhoven University of Technology** (TU/e).


The CIF 3 tooling is free, and is available under the **MIT open source license**.

### Information

- About
- Download
- Support
- Index
- Search

### Documentation

- Language tutorial
- CIF 3 textual syntax (PDF)
- Event-based supervisory controller
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- Changelog for version r7363



The screenshot shows the "Tools" page of the CIF 3 website. The browser address bar shows the URL [cif.sew.tue.nl/tools/index.html](http://cif.sew.tue.nl/tools/index.html). The page title is "Tools - CIF 3". The content is organized into several categories: "Supervisory controller synthesis" (including Event-based synthesis toolset, CIF to Supremica transformer, and CIF to SCIM transformer), "Simulation, validation, and visualization" (including CIF 3 simulator and CIF 3 to CIF 2 transformer), "Verification" (including CIF to mCRL2 transformer and CIF to Supremica transformer), "Real-time testing, code generation, and implementation" (including CIF 3 PLC code generator), and "Miscellaneous" (including CIF to CIF transformer, CIF merger, and CIF 3 event disabled). The footer contains navigation links and copyright information.

- **CIF 3 text editor**

**Supervisory controller synthesis**

- Event-based synthesis toolset
- CIF to Supremica transformer
- CIF to SCIM transformer

**Simulation, validation, and visualization**

- CIF 3 simulator
- CIF 3 to CIF 2 transformer

**Verification**

- CIF to mCRL2 transformer
- CIF to Supremica transformer

**Real-time testing, code generation, and implementation**

- CIF 3 PLC code generator

**Miscellaneous**

- CIF to CIF transformer
- CIF merger
- CIF 3 event disabled


CIF 3 » Documentation » Tools previous | next | index

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
# CIF demo

# Discrete variables

- ▶ How to represent quantities that are discrete?
  - ▶ number of vehicles in front of a traffic light
  - ▶ number of pages inside a certain part of a printer
  - ▶ menu choices in a vending machine or an ATM
- ▶ Use additional states!





# Discrete variables



- ▶ Remain constant during time passing
- ▶ May change value as consequence of a mode switch or transition

```
1 automaton counter:  
2   event inc, dec;  
3  
4   disc int count = 3;  
5  
6   location:  
7     edge dec when count > 0 do count := count - 1;  
8     edge inc when count < 5 do count := count + 1;  
9   end
```

# Invariants



# Networks of automata


- ▶ Systems are composed of several subsystems geographically or logically
- ▶ Modelling cyber-physical systems in single automaton not feasible: state space explosion

⇒ network of interacting automata

Interaction mechanisms:


- ▶ synchronization on time
- ▶ synchronization of events
- ▶ shared variables

# Independent automata





Exercise: Give a single automaton with the same behaviour

# Solution





# Synchronization on time



```
1 automaton Var_x:
2   cont x = 0;
3
4   location X:
5     initial;
6     equation x' = 2;
7 end
8
9 automaton Var_y:
10  cont y = 0;
11
12  location Y:
13    initial;
14    equation y' = 1;
15 end
```

# Synchronization of events



Exercise: Represent behaviour by single automaton.

# Synchronization of events in CIF

```
1                                     event provide;
2
3 automaton producer:                 automaton producer:
4   event produce, provide;           event produce;
5   location producing:               location producing:
6     initial;                        initial;
7     edge produce goto idle;         edge produce goto idle;
8   location idle:                   location idle:
9     edge provide goto producing;    edge provide goto producing;
10  end                                end
11
12 automaton consumer:               automaton consumer:
13   event consume;                   event consume;
14   location idle:                   location idle:
15     initial;                        initial;
16   edge producer.provide goto consuming; edge provide goto consuming;
17   location consuming:              location consuming:
18     edge consume goto idle;        edge consume goto idle;
19  end                                end
```

# Shared variables

Discrete variables:

- ▶ Declared in an automaton
- ▶ May only be assigned in that automaton
- ▶ May be read by other automata (used in guards and invariants)

Continuous variables:

- ▶ Declared in automaton or globally
- ▶ May only be assigned in the automaton they are declared in (if any)
- ▶ May be read by other automata

# CIF example

```
1 automaton queue1:
2   event enter, leave;
3   disc int count = 0;
4   location: initial;
5   edge enter when count < 2 do count := count + 1;
6   edge leave when count > 0 do count := count - 1;
7 end
8
9 automaton queue2:
10  event enter, leave;
11  disc int count = 0;
12  location: initial;
13  edge enter when count < 2 do count := count + 1;
14  edge leave when count > 0 do count := count - 1;
15 end
16
17 automaton customer:
18  location: initial;
19  edge queue1.enter when queue1.count <= queue2.count;
20  edge queue2.enter when queue2.count <= queue1.count;
21 end
```

# Recap

- ▶ Model-based systems engineering as an approach to the engineering of supervisory controllers
- ▶ Modelling formalisms hybrid automata and CIF 3.0 as supporting tool
- ▶ Various types of models
  - ▶ Continuous state or discrete state
  - ▶ Continuous time or discrete time
  - ▶ Time driven or event driven
- ▶ Various examples
  - ▶ Hybrid uncontrolled plants
  - ▶ Discrete-event supervisors

# Model-based Engineering of Supervisory Controllers

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
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# Overview

- ▶ MBSE for supervisory control synthesis
- ▶ Specification of requirements
- ▶ Basic data-based supervisory control problem
- ▶ CIF support for synthesis


# MBSE for supervisory control synthesis



 = documents;  = models;  = realizations

# Motivation

Example: safe tabletop handling in an MRI scanner



# Motivation

Control requirements:

- ▶ Ensure that the tabletop does not move beyond its vertical and horizontal end positions.
- ▶ Prevent collisions of the tabletop with the magnet.
- ▶ Define the conditions for manual and automatic movements of the tabletop.
- ▶ Enable the operator to control the system by means of the manual button and the tumble switch.

# Motivation

Two ways of working:

## 1. Traditional

- ▶ Design (manually) a supervisory controller
- ▶ Verify that the requirements are satisfied (by testing or by model checking)

## 2. Synthesis-based

- ▶ Define formal plant and requirement models
- ▶ Synthesize (automatically) the supervisory controller
- ▶ (Almost) No need for verification: the specified requirements are satisfied per construction

# Synthesis of supervisory controllers

- ▶ Model uncontrolled system components (plant)
- ▶ Model requirements
- ▶ Synthesize supervisory controller such that controlled system
  - ▶ satisfies requirements
  - ▶ is non-blocking
  - ▶ is controllable
  - ▶ is maximally permissive
- ▶ Simulate/verify/test controlled plant
- ▶ Real-time implementations can be generated

# Properties of controlled system

## 1. controlled system is non-blocking

It is possible to reach a marked state from all reachable states in the controlled system.

## 2. controlled system is controllable

For all reachable states in the controlled system, the uncontrollable events that are enabled in the same state in the uncontrolled system are still possible in the controlled system. In other words, uncontrollable events are not restricted.

## 3. controlled system is maximally permissive

The controlled system permits all safe, controllable, and non-blocking behaviors.

# Model plant

- ▶ Automata restricted to discrete elements:
- ▶ States: one initial, several marker states.
  - ▶ Marker state models task completion.
- ▶ Transitions only caused by events: controllable or uncontrollable.
  - ▶ Controllable events can be disabled — actuator commands.
  - ▶ Uncontrollable events cannot be disabled — changes to sensor readings.

# Advantages of MBSE

- ▶ Model-based systems engineering contributes to faster product development.
- ▶ Supervisor synthesis eliminates manual design of control software and reduces testing effort.
- ▶ Event-based distributed framework (e.g. modular) supports reconfigurability.
- ▶ Synthesis-based systems engineering is applicable in industry for developing supervisory controllers.
- ▶ Formal models and methods are essential for high-tech systems design.

# Guidelines for modeling components

- ▶ Split the system to be controlled into separate components.
- ▶ Define variables that describe the component behavior at the necessary abstraction level.
- ▶ Define the component state space.
- ▶ Define control and sensor signals that set and read component variables.
- ▶ Define corresponding events.
- ▶ Typically, setting control signals are controllable events, whereas reading sensor signals are uncontrollable events.

# Guidelines for modeling requirements

- ▶ Make the description of the admissible behavior as precise as possible.
- ▶ Define a few small requirements as opposed to defining a single large requirement.
- ▶ Check that requirement models correspond with their descriptions.
- ▶ If the supervisor derived is too large, the requirements are probably too relaxed.
- ▶ If the supervisor derived is too small or empty, the requirements are probably too strict or conflicting.
- ▶ Iterative development: analyze the supervisor derived for redesign of component or requirement models.



# Types of system properties

- ▶ Safety properties: “nothing bad happens in the system”.
- ▶ Liveness properties: “something good eventually happens in the system”.

In models:



- ▶ Safety: no error/blocking state is reachable.
- ▶ Liveness = progress: an action is eventually executed.

# Pump-valve example



Requirement: prevent that the pump is operating while the valve is closed.

# Pump-valve example: progress



## Pump-valve example: progress

- ▶ For this system, independent of the requirement, no proper supervisor can be synthesized or manually designed.
- ▶ The reason is the design choice for marker states: only the initial state is marked.
- ▶ As additionally, *stuck\_open* and *stuck\_close* are uncontrollable events, it is not possible to prevent the system from getting to **SC** or **SO**.
- ▶ We need to reconsider marker states choice.

# Syntax of state-based expressions

- ▶ System requirements are often expressed in terms of conditions over states.
- ▶ State-based specifications often follow naturally from informal, intuitive requirements.
- ▶ However, not every requirement can be specified as such a state-based expression.
- ▶ Requirements can also be formulated as automata.

# Syntax of state-based expressions

- ▶ *true* and *false* stand for truth values of propositional logic.
- ▶ Negation  $\neg$ , conjunction  $\wedge$ , disjunction  $\vee$  and implication  $\Rightarrow$  stand for standard logical operators.
- ▶ State predicate  $\mathbf{C.S}\downarrow$  expresses that component  $\mathbf{C}$  is in state  $\mathbf{S}$ .
- ▶ Event predicate  $\rightarrow E$  expresses that an event from set  $E$  is enabled by the supervisor.
- ▶ Most often used state-based expressions are:
  - ▶  $\rightarrow E \Rightarrow MS$
  - ▶  $MS$

where  $MS ::= true \mid false \mid \mathbf{C.S}\downarrow \mid \neg MS \mid MS \text{ op } MS$  and  $op \in \{\wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow\}$ .

## State-based expressions in CIF

- ▶  $\rightarrow E \Rightarrow MS$  is captured in CIF as

```
1   requirement name:  
2       location:  
3           initial;  
4           marked;  
5       edge e1, e2, ..., en when MS;  
6   end
```



where  $e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n$  are the events that make up set  $E$ , and  $MS$  is the CIF encoding of expression  $MS$

- ▶  $MS$  is captured in CIF as

```
1   requirement invariant MS;
```



where  $MS$  is the CIF encoding of expression  $MS$

# Exercise: Pump-valve example



Express the requirement: prevent that the pump is operating while the valve is closed.

# Answer: Pump-valve example



Prevent that the pump is operating while the valve is closed:


$$\neg((\mathbf{Valve.VC} \downarrow \vee \mathbf{Valve.SC}) \wedge \mathbf{Pump.Pon} \downarrow)$$

$$\rightarrow \{ \textit{start\_pump} \} \Rightarrow (\mathbf{Valve.VO} \downarrow \vee \mathbf{Valve.SO} \downarrow)$$

## Basic data-based supervisory control problem

Prevent the system from getting to undesired states

- ▶ By disabling controllable events
- ▶ Based on the events generated by the plant



# Basic data-based synthesis

- ▶ allow plant automata with discrete variables with finite domain:
  - ▶ Boolean
  - ▶ ranged integer type `int[0..11]`
  - ▶ enumeration type

More restrictions apply; see

<http://cif.se.wtb.tue.nl/tools/datasynth.html>

- ▶ network of plant automata first needs to be transformed into single plant automaton

# Basic data-based synthesis problem

For a plant a supervisor is required such that:

1. controlled system is non-blocking

It is possible to reach a marked state from all reachable states in the controlled system.

2. controlled system is controllable


For all reachable states in the controlled system, the uncontrollable events that are enabled in the same state in the uncontrolled system are still possible in the controlled system. In other words, uncontrollable events are not restricted.

3. controlled system is maximally permissive

The controlled system permits all safe, controllable, and non-blocking behaviors.

# High-level approach basic synthesis

Question: How does basic synthesis algorithm work?




Repeat until resulting system stabilizes:

- ▶ Identify blocking states (green is non-blocking, red is blocking)
- ▶ Identify bad states
- ▶ Remove controllable events leading into bad states

# Basic synthesis - non-blocking states

Question: How does basic synthesis algorithm work?




Repeat until resulting system stabilizes:

- ▶ Identify blocking states (green is non-blocking, red is blocking)
- ▶ Identify bad states
- ▶ Remove controllable events leading into bad states

# Basic synthesis – bad states

Question: How does basic synthesis algorithm work?




Repeat until resulting system stabilizes:

- ▶ Identify blocking states
- ▶ Identify bad states (green is bad state, red is safe state)
- ▶ Remove controllable events leading into bad states

# Basic synthesis – bad states

Question: How does basic synthesis algorithm work?




Repeat until resulting system stabilizes:

- ▶ Identify blocking states
- ▶ Identify bad states (green is bad state, red is safe state)
- ▶ Remove controllable events leading into bad states

# Basic synthesis – remove controllable events

Question: How does basic synthesis algorithm work?




Repeat until resulting system stabilizes:

- ▶ Identify blocking states
- ▶ Identify bad states
- ▶ Remove controllable events leading into bad states

# Basic synthesis – repetition

Question: How does basic synthesis algorithm work?



Repeat until resulting system stabilizes:

- ▶ Identify blocking states
- ▶ Identify bad states
- ▶ Remove controllable events leading into bad states


# Basic data-based synthesis

- ▶ Adapt the guards of the plant automaton repeatedly until the situation arises that no more changes occur.
- ▶ Each of these iterations consists of three phases:
  1. Compute nonblocking conditions for all locations of the plant.
  2. Compute bad state conditions for all locations.
  3. Adapt guards of transitions with controllable events to obtain an adapted automaton.

# Nonblocking for automata with variables

- ▶ Nonblocking depends on the actual value of the variables in the location.
- ▶ Associate with each location an expression that states for which combination of values of variables the location is nonblocking.


Exercise: Give nonblocking condition for each location



- ▶ In general, not easy to “guess”

## Computing nonblocking conditions

- ▶ Determining the nonblocking conditions is done iteratively
- ▶ Label all marker states with nonblocking condition *true* and all non-marker states with nonblocking condition *false*.
- ▶ In each next iteration: ( $N_i$  is nonblocking condition of location  $i$ )




$$N_i := N_i \vee (g_j \wedge N_j[u_j]) \vee (g_k \wedge N_k[u_k]) \vee \dots$$

- ▶  $N_j[u_j]$  is  $N_j$  where all occurrences of the variables are replaced by the expressions they are assigned in the update  $u_j$
- ▶ Always simplify the resulting predicates!




## Computed solution, iteration 2



Location 0	Location 1	Location 2
<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>
$false \vee (true \wedge false[x := x + 2])$ $= false$	$false \vee (x \leq 4 \wedge true[x := x + 1])$ $= x \leq 4$	<i>true</i>

$$N_i := N_i \vee (g_j \wedge N_j[u_j]) \vee (g_k \wedge N_k[u_k]) \vee \dots$$


## Computed solution, iteration 3



Location 0	Location 1	Location 2
<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>
<i>false</i>	$x \leq 4$	<i>true</i>
$false \vee (true \wedge x \leq 4[x := x + 2])$ $= x \leq 2$	$x \leq 4 \vee (x \leq 4 \wedge true[x := x + 1])$ $= x \leq 4$	<i>true</i>

$$N_i := N_i \vee (g_j \wedge N_j[u_j]) \vee (g_k \wedge N_k[u_k]) \vee \dots$$

## Computed solution, iteration 4





Location 0	Location 1	Location 2
<i>false</i>	<i>false</i>	<i>true</i>
<i>false</i>	$x \leq 4$	<i>true</i>
$x \leq 2$	$x \leq 4$	<i>true</i>
$x \leq 2$	$x \leq 4$	<i>true</i>

$$N_i := N_i \vee (g_j \wedge N_j[u_j]) \vee (g_k \wedge N_k[u_k]) \vee \dots$$

# Bad state conditions

- ▶ purpose of nonblocking conditions




- ▶ not allowed for uncontrollable events to enforce the required restrictions by adapting the guard
- ▶ such restrictions are propagated backwards until an edge with a controllable event is encountered (for which the guard can be restricted)
- ▶ achieved by iterative bad state condition computation

## Computing bad state conditions

- ▶ start from plant automaton and computed nonblocking conditions
- ▶ initial bad state condition for each location is the logical negation of the nonblocking condition of that location:

$$B_i := \neg N_i$$


- ▶ In each next iteration:



$$B_i := B_i \vee (g_k \wedge B_k[u_k]) \vee \dots$$

- ▶ Only for uncontrollable events!

# Computed bad state conditions, solution



Location 0	Location 1	Location 2
$x > 2$	$x > 4$	<i>false</i>
$x > 2$	$x > 4$	<i>false</i>


$$B_i := B_i \vee (g_k \wedge B_k[u_k]) \vee \dots$$

# Adapts guards


- ▶ use computed bas state conditions; these express which combinations of values of variables should be avoided in a specific location, taking into account the limitation that guards of uncontrollable events may not be altered.
- ▶ guards of the edges with a controllable event are adapted:

$$g_j := g_j \wedge \neg B_j[u_j] \wedge \dots$$


# Adapted guards, solution




Location 0	Location 1	Location 2
$x > 2$	$x > 4$	<i>false</i>
$g_j := g_j \wedge \neg B_j[u_j] \wedge \dots$		



# CIF support




# Example




Uncontrollable:  $pb_{11}$ ,  $o_2$  and  $o_3$

Requirements: No overflow and no underflow:  $3 \leq d_1 \leq 16$  and  $2 \leq d_2 \leq 8$ .


# Models




$pb_{11}$   
 $d_1 := d_1 + 1$



$tb_{13}$   
 $d_1 := d_1 - 1$



$pb_{23}$   
 $d_2 := d_2 + 1$



$tb_{22}$   
 $d_2 := d_2 - 1$

## Requirements:

```

1  requirement invariant 3 <= B1.d and B1.d <= 16;
2  requirement invariant 2 <= B2.d and B2.d <= 8;

```

# Resulting supervisor

S

```
1  alphabet i1, tb22, pb12, tb13, pb23;
2  location:
3    initial;
4    marked;
5    edge i1 when (B1.d = 8 or B1.d = 10) and (B2.d = 8 and M1.Idle) or ((B1.d =
6      8 or B1.d = 10)
7        and (B2.d = 4 and M1.Idle) or (B1.d = 8 or B1.d = 10) and ((B2
8          .d = 2 or
9            B2.d = 6) and ... ;
10   edge pb12 when B1.d = 8 and (B2.d = 8 and M2.Busy) or B1.d = 8 and (B2.d = 4
11     and ...;
12   edge pb23 when B1.d = 16 and B2.d = 4 and (M1.Idle and M3.Busy) or (B1.d =
13     16 and ...;
14   edge tb13 when B1.d = 16 and (B2.d = 8 and M3.Idle) or (B1.d = 16 and (B2.d
15     = 4 and ...;
16   edge tb22 when B1.d = 16 and B2.d = 8 and (M1.Idle and M2.Idle) or (B1.d =
17     16 and ...;
18 end
```

# Model-based Engineering of Supervisory Controllers

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IPA Formal Methods Course

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